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I. INTRODUCTION
The experience of developed countries suggeststhat the capital-goodsindustries
are transmitters of technological change and are instrumental in diffusing innova-
tions throughout the economy.' Pakistan's manufacturing industries have largelybeen
confined to consumer goods industries, such as food and textiles, which require
simple technology. Industries such as machinery, automobiles, consumer durables
and basic chemicals which require sophisticated technology were virtually non-
existent till the Seventies.2 However,output of machinery, automobilesand
consumer durables registered a sharp increase during the Eighties.
Capital-goods industries may be initiated/promoted through any of three
routes: evolutionary, policy-induced and vehicle assembly.3 The evolutionary
method to initiate capital goods production is through the formation of skilled
manpower through a gradual process starting with repairs and maintenance. The
policy-induced method of developing the capital goods industries takes the form of
creating skilled manpower through deliberate government policy. The vehicle
assembly based capital goods production minimises initial skill requirements but
helps in developing the skillsby creating demand for components and, hence, for the
skilledmanpower through on-the-job-training.
Due to the lack of the necessary skilled people Pakistan has initiated the
process of developing the capital-goods industries through vehicle assembly in the
early Eighties by encouraging assembly of automobiles, consumer durables and
capital.goodsindustries.4 Theseindustriesare encouragedby allowingconcessional
rates of duty rangingbetween zero and 60 percent5 on the import of components as
*Theauthor is Chief of Research at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,
Islamabad.
tComments on this paper have not been received
'For role of capital-goods industries in spread of technr,logy see Rosenberg (1976).
2 Even though machinery and automobiles accounted for about 9 percent of total manu-
facturing output in 1980-81, they largely consisted of traditional goods such as agricultural
implements, cycles etc.
3 For details see Chundovsky,Nagoand Jacobsson. (1983).
4For details of the industries see Government of Pakistan (1985).
5 Most of the components can be imported at concessional rate of 30 percent import
duty.
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compared to an average rate of about 100 percent import duties on the finished
goods. These incentives have been provided in the hope that over a period of five
years almost three-fourths of the components would be produced in the country.
The indigenization programme approved by the government along with
industrial sanction is called the 'Deletion Programme' in Pakistan.6 Since industrial
sanctions depend upon the undertaking of a high level of indigenization, very ambi-
tious 'deletion programmes' have been formulated. However, implementation of
these programmes, as shall be shown later, has been rather disappointing. The
capital-goods industries have mainly been confined to assembly and even where
some indigenous components/spare parts have been used, they were already in
production .7
The main objective of the paper is to review the vehicle assembly based develop-
ment of capital-goods industries in Pakistan. Since the indigenization of machinery
sectors is not being closely monitored and data are not available, the analysis
presented in this study is confined to automobiles and consumer durables only. The
paper has five sections: The Structure of Manufacturing Industries is examined in
Section II. Deletion Policy, Programmes and Achievements are examined in Section
III. The factors governing a firm's decision to produce or purchase a component
from a domestic vendor instead of importing are analysed in Section N. The final
section presents a summary of the fmdings.
exceeded the nominal protection enjoyed by the industry in the early Eighties. 9
As soon as incentives for the assembly of capital goods were created in the form of
very low concessional duties on the import of components and raw materials both
the investment as well as output of these industries increased at a very rapid rate.
Assembly operations, no doubt, created demand for the components, but due
to the low protection enjoyed by the manufacture of components, the production of
components remained low. It seems that while government was aware of the low
profi ts in manufacturing of components it resorted to administrative measures
instead of rationalizing the tariff structure to improve the profitability of producing
components. The sponsors were asked to submit a deletion programme i.e. indigeni-
zation programme, outlining the extent of indigenization to be achieved over five
years and its phasing over time. In case the sponsor failed to adhere to the deletion
programme, he could be penalized' the penalty could take the form of withdrawing
the concession on import duties on components and raw materials and refusal to
grant expansion of the assembly activities. 10
m. DELETIONPOLICY,PROGRAMMESAND ACHIEVEMENTS
n. STRUCTUREOF MANUFACTURINGINDUSTRIESOF PAKISTAN
In order to encourage assembly-cum-manufacture, the government provided
incentives to assembly through lower import duties on components only against an
approved 'deletion' programme.11 These programmes are analysed before reviewing
the deletion policy which underwent major changes in 1987. Deletion programmes
and the achievement shown in Table 1, bring out the fact that the deletion program-
me in most of the cases have been quite ambitious and unrealistic. For example,
with a capacity to manufacture only ten to fifteen thousand cars per annum, it is
wishful thinking to start producing 84 percent of the parts in the country by the
fifth year of operation. Whereas targets for indigenization had been very high,
performance, except in the case of tractors, has been very disappointing. Moreover,
both the indigenization targets and realisations vary significantly across different
firms within an industry. For example, deletion achieved ranges between 19.9
percent and 64.9 percent in case of tractors and between 10.8 percent and 65 per-
cent in case of buses.
Deletion programmes have been drawn in terms of the percentage of complete-
ly built units (CBU) rather than as the percentage of completely knocked down
While the large-scale manufacturing sector accounts for about 13 percent of
the output almost two-fiths of manufacturing output is accounted for by the food
and textiles industries. The share of electrical and non-electrical machinery and
automobile industries in value added originating in the large-scalemanufacturing
sector until 1980-81 stagnated at very low levels. Their share was 8.2, 8.1 and 9.1
percent in 1959-60, 1969-70 and 1980-81 respectively. However, mainly because
of a sharp increase in the production of motor vehicles, batteries, metal fabrication
and textile machinery, their share in large-scalemanufacturing value added increased
to 16.3 percent in 1983-84.8
The growth of capital-goods industries was constrained by the fact that they
were being penalized in the sense that the incidence of import duties on inputs
6It is called deletion programme because the components which are manufactured in the
country are deleted from the list of components which enjoy concessionary rate of duty.
7 Sometimes the industrialists did not use even the parts already being manufactured in
the country e.g., indigenous tyres and batteries were not used by the Automobiles industry.
8The last Census Manufacturing relates to 1983-84. The share of these sectors and con-
sumer durables must have increased further because of heavy investment in these sectors over
last few years.
9See, Naqvi and Kemal (1983).
lOin the new policy on 'deletion', there are no capacity constraints on the expansion
assembly operations.
11Ministry of Industries monitors programmes relating to automobilies and consumer
durables. Central Board of Revenue also had a deletion programme; any firm agreeing to 'delete'
75 percent parts over a five-year period was granted tax concession irrespective of the deletion
programme approved by Ministry of Industries.
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Table 1 - (Continued)



































Source: Ministry of Industries,
(CKD) units, Le. total components forming total kit. This exaggeratesthe indigeniza-
tion of components. Besides components which hardly involve any sophisticated
technology and which are already being produced in the country, are also counted
towards deletion. The distinction is important because CBUalso contains cost of
assembly and body manufacturing and as such linking the percentage to CBU
exaggerates the deletion levels realized. For example, in the case of refrigerators,
air-conditioners and deep-freezers, the indigenization target of 65 percent, which
looks rather high, consists of body assembly and components such as plastic and
rubber parts, metal parts. cabinet parts and electrical parts. Whilethe crucial and
basic parts such as compressors, 'thermostat controls, overload relay, evaporators,
gasket/capacitor and copper tubing are neither being produced in the country nor
are part of the deletion programme. Moreover, the coverage of indigenization pro-
grammes has been restricted to the manufacturing of components for the industry:
it ignores backward linkages.




I. Trucks 1988 1991 1988
Firm 1 40.9 81.2 17.3
Firm 2 38.2 82.0 27.0
Firm 3 36.7 81.3 18.2
Firm 4 71.5 74.2 53.9
II. Buses 1988 1991 1988
Firm 1 40.9 81.2 17.3
Firm 2 38.2 82.0 23.4
Firm 3 51.4 74.9 32.0
Firm 4 37.7 75.1 22.9
III. Cars, Vans, Pickups and Jeeps 1987 1989 1987
Cars 53.5 80.8 31.2
Vans 55.3 73.9 23.4
Pickups 57.4 82.9 31.1
Jeeps 55.0 81.0 45.8
N. Tractors 1985 1987-88 1986
Firm 1, Model A 64.7 81.8 66.3
Firm 1, Model B 19.9 53.6 20.0
Firm 2, Model A 59.9 82.4 47.3
Firm 2, Model B 25.2 60.8 36.1
Firm 3 60.8 87.1 48.5
Firm 4 52.6 72.0 46.4
Firm 5, Model A 64.9 85.6 49.8
Firm 5, Model B 62.9 85.6 47.8
V. Two and Three Wheelers 1985 199 1987
Motorcycles 73.6 73.6 50.6
Scooters 75.0 75.0 57.6
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The failure of the indigenization programmesled the government to reviewthe
'Deletion Policy' which consequently underwent major changes in 1987. The salient
features of the present 'Deletion' policy are detailed in Kemal (1989). Whilethe new
policy is an improvement over the earlier policy in the sense that heavier penalties
have been imposed through withdrawal of total/partial concessions in import duties
on components rather than through capacity constraints, and a cell has been created
to draw realistic deletion plans and monitor them, it still relies on penalties for
defaulters instead of rewards for indigenization. It needs to be underscored that
defaulters wouid always find an excuse for their failure to avoid penalties. The past
experience suggests that the sponsors have always been successful in extending the
deadlines for deletion without any penalty. Therefore, sponsors rightly feel that the
probability of penalties being imposed is low.
N. DETERMINANTSOFDOMESTICMANUFACTURING
OF COMPONENTS
The decision to produce or purchase a component from a domestic vendor
instead of importing it depends upon whether the domestic production of com-
ponents would raise or lower the profits. The decision is also constrained by the
technical agreements to transfer technology by the sponsors' to produce the com-
ponent and the effect of domestic component proquction on the profits of the
foreign collaborator. Therefore, we have to analyse the behaviour of both the
domestic incorporated firm and the foreign collaborator.
Profits (II) of the domestic incorporated firm are:
II d n dp -~ P.a.
i = 1 I I
(1)=
where:
P d is domestic price of output:
a. is the ith input required to produce one unit of output, where the firstI
k inputs are domestic while the remaining n-k inputs are imported; and
P~ is domestic market price of an indigenous input when i = 1, . . . . . k andI
to landed cost of an imported input when it refers to last n-k inputs.
Price of output is set by the firm at a point which maximises his profits.
However,the domestic price would be no higher than the landed cost.
pd < pW(1 +t) (2)
where
pw is c & fvalue of output. J
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Whether an input will be produced in the country or not depends upon whether
the domestic activity is sufficiently protected to offset cost dis-advantages or not, i.e.





The domestic cost of producing an additional component is governed by the
extent of indigenization already accomplished in the country, tariffs on raw materials
and volume of production, Le.




D is the cumulative idigenization realisedin the industry;
t is the tariff on raw materials used in the production of ith component; and
p
Y is volume of output.
and
ac~ ac~ ac~
L > 0 ---1- > 0 L < 0 . ...
aD a t a Y ,
p
(6)
It becomes increasingly difficult to indigenize after a certain level of indigeni-
zation has been achieved because of the complexity and the sophistication of
technology required to produce the remaining components. Since technology
transfer is difficult and costly, the ratio of costs of production to c. & f. value
increases more sharply as cumulative indigenization increases. The positive relation-
ship between cost and tariff on inputs is obvious. Finally, scale economies in the
production of components suggest a negative relationship between costs and
magnitude of output.
Substituting Equations (5) and (3) into Equation (4) givesus.
c~ (D, tp' Y) ~ P/d ~ p/w (I + t/) (7)
The relationship shows that the differential rates of tariffs on components
and raw materials mayor may not be sufficient to offset cost disadvantagesin the
production of a component at very low volumes of output. This relationship would
determine the sizeof k in Equation 1.
Since the size of market, particularly in the initial stages, is limited and skilled
manpower is also in short supply the cost of production is expected to be significant-
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ly higher than the c. & f. value. For example, Pratten (1971) has estimated that the
minimum efficient size of a car plant ranges between 100,000 to 250,000 whereas
the size of the plant in Pakistan has been around 15,000. In countries like Thailand,
with the market around 65,000,the penaltycosts12 for radiators,starters,regulators
and wiper sets were 60, 175, 146 and 180 percent respectively. In case of Malaysia
the penalty costs for shock absorber and filter element were 93 and 152 percent
respectively.13 Therefore,mere exemptionfrom duty on raw materialswouldbe
inadequate to encourage domestic production unless the statutory rates of duty
are imposed on the import component.
When a duopolistic or oligopolistic structure of the market prevails, which is
the case in almost all the consumer durables in Pakistan, the firm's decision to
indigenize is influenced by the rival firm's decision to indigenize. If a part/component
is indigenized by any firm in an industry, the concessional duty on import of that
component is withdrawn from all the firms. Accordingly, the indigenization may
be conceivedas a non-zero sum gamewith the following pay-offs.
inputs which are subject to the statutory rates of duties.14
While the new deletion policy, no doubt, suggests imposi tion of penalties, and
fixing c. &. f. values of components, yet past experience with government's resolve
to impose penalties does not hold much promise. It is very likely that on the
assumption that the probability of penalties being imposed is rather low, the pro-
ducers would collude and decide not to indigenize.
Even when the domestic firm finds it advantageous to indigenize, the foreign
collaborator may not be interested if the total profits, consisting of the share in the
profits of the domestic firm and the profits from sales of components, fall. The
principal's profits (IIr) are:
IIr = n w'YL P. a. + 1)II
k + 1 I I
'Y is the profit of foreign collaborator through sales of components measured
as a percentage of the c. & f. value of component; and





(a , b )
11 11
(all' b21)
(a 12' b 1 2 )
(a22' b22)
Obviously when the domestic manufacturing of the component increases the
foreign collaborator's sales of components would fall and consequently his profits
would also fall. The profits of domestic firms may fall or rise depending upon the
cost inefficiencies. In general, cost inefficienciesmay e{(ceedthe concessionalduties
and as such profits would fall. Even where the cost inefficiencies fall short of
concessional duties, increase in his profits from the domestic incorporated firm may
be insufficient to comp~nsate for the decline in profits from sale of components.
Therefore, the foreign collaborator is expected to resist indigenization. Only when
the penalty duties are high (leading to a steep fall in the expected profits of the
domestic firm as well as that of the foreign collaborator), would the foreign
collaborator consider indigenization. It also follows that the higher the share of
foreign collaborators in the equity of the domestic incorporated firm, greater are the
chances for indigenization.
In the existing policy framework, where the duty on the finished product is
about 100 percent, and the concessional import duties on components are 20 per-
cent, huge profit margins are created at the assembly stage. The profits tend to fall
as more and more parts are manufactured. A system which envisagesthe declining
profit rates with indigenization does not have much prospect of success. The pro-
ducer is showered with threats of penalties to force indigenization, but you can take
a horse to water but cannot make it drink even if you whip.it.
Obviously if the domestic production of a component is profitable even when
the components are subject to concessional rates of duty i.e. the difference between
the c. & f. price and the cost of production falls short of concessional duty on the
import of components, both firms would indigenize with pay-offs (all' b11)' On the
other hand, if the cost disadvantagesexceed even the statutory rates of import duty
on components, none of the firms would try to indigenizewith pay-offs (a ,b ).22 22
However, when the inefficiency in production exceeds the concessional rate of
import duties, but falls short of the penalty duty, the producer will have to chalk
out a strategy; they may collude or take independent decisions.
The collusion strategy leads to higher profits for both the firms, if the govern-
ment fails to impose penalties and to lower profits for both the firms if government
imposes the penalty duties. Therefore, the probability of penalties being imposed
would be a major determinant in the decision to indigenize. Besidesthe producer
may be able to evade the penalty duty by raising the transfer price of those com-
ponents which still enjoy the benefit of concessional duties, and lower the price of
12 Penal ty cost is the extent by which cost of domestic production exceeds the c. & f.
values.
13See. Chundovsky, Nago and Jacobsson (1983).
14The c. & f. price of component subjected to concessional import duties is raised to
ensure the foreign exchange repatriation to pay full for the transferred components to domestic
firm by the head-office.
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The simple fact is that incentives rather than the administrative mechanism can
accomplish the desired economic results need to be underscored. For indigenization,
the production of components will have to be made more profitable than the
assembly. Accordingly, instead of allowing the sponsor to import components at
only 30 percent and thus creating huge margins for assembly, the rate of import
duty on components should be brought closer to the import duty o~ the finished
product. As a firm accomplishes certain percentage of indigenization, the rate of
import duty on the remaining imported components should be lowered. The incen-
tives need to be built-in in the form of progressivelyhigher rebates in import duty
on the remaining imported components as higher and higher levelsof indigenization
are attained.
Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider and A. R. Kemal (1983). Structure of Protection in
Pakistan: 1980-81. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
Pakistan, Government of (Various Issues). Census of Manufacturing Industries.
Islamabad: Bureau of Statistics.
Pakistan, Government of (1985). Pakistan Customs Tariff. Islamabad: Central
Board of Revenue.
Pratten, C. F. (1971). Economies of Sales in Manufacturing Industries. Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press.
Rosenberg, N. (1976). Perspective on Technology. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of the study are summarised below.
(i) Enhanced incentives for assembly has resulted in the sharp increase of
production in the capital-goodsindustries in the Eighties;
(ii) The policy of concessional duties on imported components, which led
to rapid expansion in the assembly lines is the main stumbling block in
the way of indigenization;
(iii) The government's policy to raise profitability of assembly and forcing
producers through penalties to indigenize does not have very bright pro-
spects as no producer would willingly go for a programme which promises
decliningprofits over time;
(iv) The producer has a perception of very low probability of the penalties
being imposed. Even when penalties are imposed in the form of high
import duties on components, the transfer price mechanism may be used
to lower the total incidence of import duties;
(v) The foreign collaborator has the least incentive to indigenize as he loses
profits due to reduction in his sales of components. A higher share in
equity would encourage the foreign collaborator to transfer technology;
and
(vi) The deletion policy needs a basic change by relying on incentives instead
of penalties. The assembly should be made less profitable and the rate
of duty on components should be positively related to the percentage of
components being imported.
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